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Abstract—In this paper, we address the problem of spec-
trum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same
frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic
non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the
spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (N.E). Given a
set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which
renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. For this reason,
the spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg
game where the ﬁrst operator is already being deployed and the
secondary operator follows next. The Stackelberg equilibrium
(S.E) is reached where the best response of the secondary
operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary
operator’s utility function. Finally, we assess the goodness of the
proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to
the centralized approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum sharing between wireless networks improves the
efﬁciency of spectrum usage, and thereby alleviates spectrum
scarcity due to growing demands for wireless broadband
access. To improve the under-utilization of spectrum resources,
we study spectrum sharing between two competing operators
operating in the same frequency band in which base stations
communicate with their mobile terminals. In this case, a
transmitter T1 wants to send information to its mobile R1,
while at the same time another base station T2 (from another
operator) wants to transmit information to its mobile R2.
These systems therefore share the same spectrum where the
communication between the pairs (T1,R 1) and (T2,R 2) takes
place simultaneously and on the same frequency band. This
setup is known as the interference channel (IFC) ( [1]- [3], [5]
and [8] to mention a few).
There is a great deal of work on the IFC channel using
game theory. In [3], the problem of power allocation in a
frequency-selective multi-user interference channel is studied.
An iterative Water-Filling (WF) algorithm is proposed to efﬁ-
ciently reach the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it is found that
under suitable conditions, the iterative WF algorithm for the
two-user gaussian interference game converges to the unique
Nash equilibrium from any starting point. In their scenario, the
Nash equilibria lead to non-efﬁcient and non pareto-optimal
solutions. Similarly, in [1], the authors consider the problem
of spectrum sharing on the IFC for ﬂat-fading channels. The
interference channel is viewed as a non-cooperative game and
the Nash equilibrium is characterized under a set of sufﬁcient
conditions. In [6], the authors investigate the problem of simul-
taneous water-ﬁlling solution for the gaussian IFC under weak
interference. Motivated by the pareto-inefﬁciency of the water-
ﬁlling approach, the authors propose a distributed algorithm to
transform a symmetric system from simultaneously waterﬁlled
to a fair orthogonal signal space partitions.
In [10], the problem of two wireless networks operating
on the same frequency band was considered. Pairs within a
given network cooperate to schedule transmissions according
to a random access protocol where each network chooses an
access probability for its users. In [7], the authors consider
the problem of coordinating two competing multiple-antenna
wireless systems in the Multiple Input Single Output (MISO)
IFC. It turns out that if the systems do not cooperate, then
the corresponding equilibrium rates are bounded regardless of
how much transmit power the base stations have available.
Also, Nash bargaining solutions were found to be close to the
sum-rate bound. On the other hand, in [12]- [14] the authors
study the problem of maximizing mutual information subject
to mask constraints and transmit power, for both simultaneous
and asynchronous1 cases. The existence of the Nash equi-
librium is proven and sufﬁcient conditions are given for the
uniqueness. Finally, in [13], distributed iterative algorithms are
proposed to reach the Nash equilibrium.
In most of these works, the existence of the Nash equi-
librium is easily demonstrated, whereas the uniqueness is
generally more complicated for which only sufﬁcient con-
ditions are given. Because of the very hard problem of the
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium points in the WF game,
Nash bargaining (NBS) solutions were considered in [5].
However, NBS requires the knowledge of all channel state
information which is not always possible in practice.
Within the same framework but under a different scenario,
Stackelberg games [15] have been applied in the context of
cognitive radios where the desirability of outcomes depends
not only on their own actions but also on other cognitive
radios. Stackelberg is furthermore based on a leader follower
approach in which the leader plays his strategy before the fol-
lower and then enforces it. In [20], a game theoretic framework
has been proposed in the context of fading multiple-access
channel. A Stackelberg formulation is proposed in which the
base station is the designated game leader with the purpose to
1Under this setup, some users are allowed to update their strategy more
frequently than the others. And, they might even perform these updates using
outdated information on the interference caused by others.
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of the capacity region. In [21], a two-level Stackelberg game
is proposed for distributed relay selection and power control
for multi-user cooperative networks. The objective is to jointly
consider the beneﬁts of source and relay nodes in which the
source node is modeled as a buyer and the relay nodes as
the sellers. Moreover, in [16], the authors investigate a similar
power allocation problem but solely focus on channel realiza-
tions in which the Nash equilibrium of the game is unique.
However, in this work the Stackelberg approach is mainly
motivated by the non-uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and
unpredictability of the game.
In essence, the fundamental questions we address in this
paper are the following:
• If both transmitters T1 and T2 simultaneously operate in a
non-cooperative (i.e. selﬁsh) manner, what are their power
allocation strategies across their carriers? clearly, there
is a conﬂict situation where a good strategy for the link
(T1,R 1) will generate interference for R2 and vice-versa.
Hence an equilibrium has to be found.
• Given any set of channel realizations, is it possible to
predict the outcome of the game? if so, how to character-
ize the Nash equilibria regions? Is the Nash equilibrium
unique?
• What is the outcome of the spectrum sharing game when
operators do not play simultaneously, but hierarchically?
• How close is the distributed approach from the centralized
(sum-rate) power allocation?.
The paper is organized as follows: The system model is
introduced in Section II. In Section III, the spectrum sharing
game is formulated using non-cooperative game theory. In
Section IV, a special case with two transmitters and two
carriers is investigated. Moreover, in Section V, we formulate
the non-cooperative problem as a Stackelberg game to tackle
the non-uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Finally, Section
VI provides a comparison between the distributed (selﬁsh)
and centralized approach. Finally, we conclude this work in
Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We suppose that K transmitters2 share a frequency band
composed of N carriers where each transmitter transmits
in any combination of channels and at any time. On each
carrier n =1 ..N, transmitter i =1 ..K sends the information
xn
i =
 
pn
i sn
i , where sn
i represents the transmitted data and
pn
i denotes the corresponding transmitted power of user i on
carrier n. The received signal at the receiver i in carrier n can
be expressed as:
rn
i =
K  
j=1
hn
jixn
j + wn
i ,i =1 ,..,K n =1 ,..,N (1)
where hn
ji is the fading channel gain on the nth carrier
between the pair (Ti,Rj). In addition, the noise process wn
i
2The terms transmitter and operator are intercheanbly used in this paper
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Fig. 1. K-Transmitters N-Carriers interference channel under study.
is characterized by its received noise power on each carrier n,
by σ2
n.
For user k, the transmit power is subject to its power
constraint:
N  
n=1
pn
i ≤ ¯ Pi,i =1 ,..,K (2)
At the receiver i, the signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) on carrier n is given by:
SINRn
i =
pn
i |hn
ii|2
σ2
n +
 K
j=1,j =i pn
j |hn
ji|2 (3)
for each user, given that all other users use Gaussian
codebooks, the codebook that maximizes mutual information
is also Gaussian [26]. Furthermore, (assuming static links) the
maximum achievable rate at receiver i is given by:
Ri =
N  
n=1
log2(1 + SINRn
i ) (4)
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section, we model the spectrum sharing problem
from a non-cooperative standpoint [22]. Figure 1 illustrates
the spectrum sharing scenario under study.
A. Game Formulation
The non-cooperative spectrum sharing game is deﬁned as:
ΓNCG  [K,{Pi}i∈K,{Ui}i∈K]. The players (from the set
K  {1,2,..,K}) are deﬁned as the different links with a
strategy pn
i ∈P i and the payoffs are the achievable rates on
each link ui(pn
i ,p n
−i)=Ri(pn
i ,p n
−i) ∈U i,f o ri =1 ,..K
and n =1 ,..N. The notation ”-i” denotes the player other
than i. Each player competes against the others by choosing
his transmit power (i.e., strategy) to maximize his own utility
subject to some power constraints ¯ Pi. In this work, we assume
full channel state information.
Since the transmitters do not cooperate, the only reasonable
outcome of the spectrum conﬂict is an operating point which
constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (N.E) [24]. This is a point
where none of the players can improve their utilities by
unilaterally changing their strategies. One should note that a
N.E is not an optimal or even desirable outcome. However, it
is an insightful point where one is likely to end up operating
if both players are not willing to cooperate.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the Nash Equilibria Space where (α1,α 2) denotes the
power allocation strategy for both operators 1 and 2, on the ﬁrst carrier.
In a non-cooperative approach, user 1 selﬁshly maximizes
his utility function subject to the power constraint ¯ P1:
max
pn
1
R1 = maxpn
1
 N
n=1 log2(1 +
|h
n
11|
2p
n
1
σ2
n+
  K
j=1,j =1 |hn
j1|2pn
j
)
s.t.
 N
n=1 pn
1 ≤ ¯ P1
pn
1 ≥ 0 (5)
Furthermore, the channel realization set h is deﬁned as:
h = {hn
ij : i,j =1 ,..,K, n =1 ,..,N} (6)
Likewise for user 2, the rate maximization problem is given
by:
max
pn
2
R2 = maxpn
2
 N
n=1 log2(1 +
|h
n
22|
2p
n
2
σ2
n+
  K
j=1,j =2 |hn
j2|2pn
j
)
s.t.
 N
n=1 pn
2 ≤ ¯ P2
pn
2 ≥ 0 (7)
The solutions to Equations (5)-(7) are given by the water-
ﬁlling power allocation solutions:
pn
i =
 
1
μi
−
σ2
n +
 
i |hn
−ii|2pn
−i
|hn
ii|2
 +
i =1 ,..,K n =1 ,..,N
(8)
where (x)+ = max{x,0} and μi > 0 is the Lagrangian
multiplier chosen to satisfy the power constraint:
 N
n=1 pn
i =
¯ Pi. Note that the equality follows from the concavity of
the objective function in pi. Finally, (8) represents the best
response of player pi given p−i.
IV. SPECIAL CASE OF TWO TRANSMITTERS AND TWO
CARRIERS
In order to gain insight into the properties of the Nash
equilibria for our game, we focus on a system with two
operators and two carriers (i.e., K = N =2 ).
A. Notations
- For ease of notation and readability that will prove helpful
in the sequel, we introduce the following notations: gn
ij =
¯ Pi|h
n
ij|
2
σ2
n , c1 =
g
1
11
g2
11 and c2 =
g
1
22
g2
22.
- The pair (α1,α2) means that user 1 transmits with power
(p1
1,p 2
1)=( α1 ¯ P1,(1−α1) ¯ P1) on carrier 1 and 2 while user 2
transmits with power (p1
2,p 2
2)=( α2 ¯ P2,(1−α2) ¯ P2) on carrier
1 and 2, respectively.
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22
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g
1
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Fig. 3. Characterization of the Nash equilibria regions given a set of channel
realizations h.
I II
III IV
Fig. 4. All four cases are depicted: I) when
1+g1
11
1+g2
21
>
1+g1
21
1+g2
11
and
1+g1
22
1+g2
12
>
1+g1
12
1+g2
22
, II) when
1+g1
11
1+g2
21
<
1+g1
21
1+g2
11
and
1+g1
22
1+g2
12
>
1+g1
12
1+g2
22
, III) when
1+g1
11
1+g2
21
>
1+g1
21
1+g2
11
and
1+g1
22
1+g2
12
<
1+g1
12
1+g2
22
and ﬁnally, IV)
1+g1
11
1+g2
21
<
1+g1
21
1+g2
11
and
1+g1
22
1+g2
12
<
1+g1
12
1+g2
22
.
Figure 2 depicts the space of the 9 Nash equilibria of the
game obtained upon solving Equation (8), the details of which
are given in appendix A. Given a set of channel realizations
h, the game converges to different equilibrium points. Figure
3 illustrates one possible representation of the Nash equilibria
space. Depending on the quantities
1+g
1
21
1+g2
11,
1+g
1
11
1+g2
21 and
1+g
1
22
1+g2
12,
1+g
1
12
1+g2
22 (see appendix A) four different representation of the
regions are possible. These regions are depicted in Figure 4
whose purpose is to reﬂect the 8-dimensional problem related
to the channel realization set h.
It turns out that given certain channel realizations, the Nash
equilibrium is unique (white rectangle areas) while some of the
grayish rectangle regions exhibit at least one Nash equilibria.
B. Existence of the Nash Equilibria
The existence of the Nash equilibria is proven using the
theorem in [25] within the context of non-cooperative concave
games. Hence, the game deﬁned in (4) admits at least one Nash
equilibrium.
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As previously mentioned, proving the uniqueness of the N.E
is in general difﬁcult [5]. In [3], the authors give sufﬁcient3
conditions for the uniqueness of the N.E. However, the authors
do not precisely state which N.E are obtained for any given
channel realization set h. Therefore building on these results,
a full characterization of the Nash equilibria region for the
2 users 2 carriers case is highlighted herein. In addition, the
proof of the uniqueness when both operators transmit in both
carriers is given in appendix B. Finally, it is worth mentioning
that the sufﬁcient conditions given for the ﬂat-fading case
studied in [1] are depicted in Figure 3 for the low-interferece
regime (X,Y).
On the other hand, we note that when one of the cross-gain
|h−i,i|2 =0 , the IFC becomes a Z-channel [19] where the
N.E. exists and is unique (the characterization of the Nash
equilibria region for the Z-channel follows the same lines as
the IFC).
V. STACKELBERG GAME
In the previous section, the users were assumed to be non-
cooperative hence operating at the Nash Equilibrium was the
best response of a user in a selﬁsh context, when the game is
played simultaneously. It was also shown that in some regions
and given a set of channel realizations, the game is predictable
with a unique Nash equilibrium. However, in other regions and
given a set of channel realizations, non-unique Nash equilibria
exist. In this case, the spectrum sharing game is no longer
predictable.
Motivated by this result, a Stackelberg game ΓSG 
[K,{Pi}i∈K,{Ui}i∈K] is proposed to model the spectrum
sharing problem where one of the two users is chosen to
be the leader. The Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) [15] is the
best response where a hierarchy of actions exists between
players. Backward induction is applied assuming that players
can reliably forecast the behavior of other players and that they
believe that the other player can do the same. For this reason,
the key point in this setup is the capability of the follower
of sensing the environment and therefore the power level of
user 1 (the leader). Note that in the Stackelberg approach all
channels should be known4.
A. Problem Formulation
Without loss of generality, we assume that T1 is the leader
and T2 is the follower5.
Deﬁnition 1: (Stackelberg Equilibrium) [22] A strategy
proﬁle (pSE
1 ,pSE
2 ) is called a Stackelberg Equilibrium if pSE
1
maximizes the utility of the leader (user 1) and pSE
2 is the
3The N.E is unique if ρ(S(k)) < 1, for all k ∈{ 1,..,N} where S(k) is
given in [14] and ρ is the spectral radius.
4This assumption can be considered strong. But it is in the advantage of
operators to sense the environment and think in a long-term prospect rather
than being myopic.
5The other case is similar. One can think of a TDMA approach or round-
robin where users leadership is alternated.
best response of user 2 to user 1.
The Stackelberg spectrum sharing game can be formulated
as follows. First, in the high-level problem (9), operator 1 max-
imizes his own utility function. Then, in the low-level problem
(10), operator 2 (follower) maximizes his own utility taking
into account the optimal power allocation of operator 1 (pSE
1 ).
By denoting (pSE
1 ,p SE
2 ) as the Stackelberg Equilibrium, the
rate optimization problem for operator 1 (leader) writes as:
max
pn
1
N  
n=1
log2
 
1+
|hn
11|2pn
1
σ2
n + |hn
21|2pn
2
 
(9)
N  
n=1
pn
1 ≤ ¯ P1
pn
1 ≥ 0
The rate optimization problem for operator 2 (follower) writes
as:
max
pn
2
N  
n=1
log2
 
1+
|hn
22|2pn
2
σ2
n + |hn
12|2 (pn
1)
SE
 
(10)
N  
n=1
pn
2 ≤ ¯ P2
pn
2 ≥ 0
where pSE
2 = BR2(pSE
1 ).
Using backward induction and given the best response of
operator 2 (the follower), (10) can be rewritten as:
max
pn
1
N  
n=1
log2
⎛
⎜
⎝1+
|hn
11|2pn
1
σ2
n + |hn
21|2
 
1
μ2 −
σ2
n+|hn
12|2pn
1 )
|hn
22|2
 +
⎞
⎟
⎠
(11)
N  
n=1
pn
1 ≤ ¯ P1
pn
1 ≥ 0
The Stackelberg game boils down to solving (11). To this
end, several cases are considered. In our spectrum sharing
problem (K = N =2 ), the power strategies of operator 2
take 3 values. In the ﬁrst case, operator 2 transmits with
maximum power ¯ P2 in carrier 1 such that (p1
2 = ¯ P2,p 2
2 =0 ) .
In the second case, operator 2 transmits with ¯ P2 in carrier
2 such that (p1
2 =0 ,p 2
2 = ¯ P2) and ﬁnally in the third case,
operator 2 transmits with (p1
2 = x,p2
2 = ¯ P2−x), 0 <x< ¯ P2.
Therefore, the leader maximizes his utility function given
the best response of the follower. In the following, the three
cases are investigated:
1) Operator 2 transmits only in carrier 2
(p1
2 = 0,p2
2 = 1)
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2 > 0 ⇒ p1
1 ≥ β1 where:
β1 =
σ
2
2
|h2
22|2 +
|h
2
12|
2
|h2
22|2 −
σ
2
1
|h1
22|2 +1
|h1
12|2
|h1
22|2 +
|h2
12|2
|h2
22|2
(12)
Furthermore, the maximization problem for the leader is
written as:
max
p1
1
log2
 
1+
|h
1
11|
2p
1
1
σ2
1
 
+ log2
 
1+
|h
2
11|
2( ¯ P1−p
1
1)
σ2
2+|h2
21|2
 
max(β1,0) ≤ p1
1 ≤ ¯ P1 (13)
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) [23] conditions are
given by:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎩
λ∗
1((p1
1)∗ − max(β1,0)) = 0,λ ∗
1 ≥ 0
λ∗
2((p1
1)∗ − ¯ P1)=0 ,λ ∗
2 ≥ 0
∂L1
∂p1
1 =0 , (p1
1)∗ ≤ ¯ P1
(p1
1)∗ ≥ max(β1,0)
where λ∗
1,λ ∗
2 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated
with the constraints given above.
L1 = log2
 
1+
|h1
11|2p1
1
σ2
1
 
+ log2
 
1+
|h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − p1
1)
σ2
2 + |h2
21|2
 
−λ∗
1(p1
1 − max(β1,0)) + λ∗
2(p1
1 − ¯ P1) (14)
∂L1
∂p1
1
=0⇒
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h1
11|2p1
1
−
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
21|2 + |h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − p1
1)
= λ∗
1 − λ∗
2 (15)
Assume that p1
1 = max(β1,0). Then, λ∗
1 ≥ 0,λ ∗
2 =0
and:
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h1
11|2 max(β1,0)
−
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
21|2 + |h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − max(β1,0))
≥ 0 (16)
Now assuming that p1
1 = ¯ P1, then λ∗
1 =0 ,λ ∗
2 ≥ 0 and:
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h1
11|2 ¯ P1
−
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
21|2 ≤ 0 (17)
Finally, assuming that max(β1,0) <p 1
1 < ¯ P1, then
λ∗
1 = λ∗
2 =0and:
p1
1 =
σ2
1|h1
11|2 − σ2
2|h2
11|2 + |h1
11|2(|h2
21|2 + |h2
11|2 ¯ P1)
2|h1
11|2|h2
11|2
(18)
2) Operator 2 transmits only in carrier 1
(p1
2 = 1,p2
2 = 0)
Under this setup, p1
2 > 0 ⇒ p1
1 ≤ β2 where
β2 =
σ
2
|h2
22|2 +
|h
2
12|
2
|h2
22|2 − σ
2
|h1
22|2 − 1
|h1
12|2
|h1
22|2 +
|h2
12|2
|h2
22|2
(19)
Furthermore, the maximization problem for the leader
writes as:
max
p1
1
log2
 
1+
|h1
11|2p1
1
σ2
1 + |h1
21|2
 
+ log2
 
1+
|h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − p1
1)
σ2
2
 
0 ≤ p1
1 ≤ min(β2, ¯ P1)
(20)
Likewise, to derive the KKT conditions, form the La-
grangian denoted as L2.
L2 = log2
 
1+
|h1
11|2p1
1
σ2
1 + |h1
21|2
 
+ log2
 
1+
|h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − p1
1)
σ2
2
 
−λ∗
1p1
1 + λ∗
2(p1
1 − min(β2, ¯ P1))
(21)
the KKT conditions are:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
λ∗
2((p1
1)∗ − min(β2, ¯ P1)) = 0,λ ∗
2 ≥ 0
λ∗
1((p1
1)∗)=0 ,λ ∗
1 ≥ 0
∂L2
∂p1
1 =0 ,
(p1
1)∗ ≥ 0,
(p1
1)∗ ≤ min(β2, ¯ P1)
where λ∗
1,λ ∗
2 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated
with the constraints.
∂L2
∂p1
1
=0⇒
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h2
21|2 + |h1
11|2p1
1
−
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − p1
1)
= λ∗
1 − λ∗
2 (22)
Assume that p1
1 =0 , λ∗
1 ≥ 0, then λ∗
2 =0and
furthermore:
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h2
21|2 −
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
11|2 ¯ P1
≥ 0 (23)
Assuming that p1
1 = min(β2, ¯ P1), λ2 ≥ 0, then λ1 =0
and furthermore:
|h1
11|2
σ2
1 + |h2
21|2 + |h1
11|2 min(β2, ¯ P1)
−
|h2
11|2
σ2
2 + |h2
11|2( ¯ P1 − min(β2, ¯ P1))
= λ∗
1 − λ∗
2 (24)
Finally, assume that 0 <p 1
1 < min(β2, ¯ P1), then λ∗
1 =
λ∗
2 =0and:
p1
1 =
|h1
11|2σ2
2 −| h2
11|2σ2
1 + |h2
11|2(|h1
11|2 ¯ P1 −| h2
21|2)
2|h1
11|2|h2
11|2
(25)
3) Operator 2 transmits in both carriers
(p1
2 = x,p2
2 = 1 − x)
max
p1
1
log2
 
1+
|h1
11|2p1
1
σ2
1 + |h1
21|2x
 
+ log2
 
1+
|h2
11|2p2
1
σ2
2 + |h2
21|2(1 − x)
 
p1
1 + p2
1 ≤ ¯ P1,
p1
1,p 2
1 ≥ 0,
β2 <p 1
1 <β 1 (26)
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Fig. 5. Power allocation strategies for the Stackelberg game in which 6 cases
exist depending on the variables β1 and β2 (β2 <β 1). The X-axis depicts
the strategy space for the leader transmitting with power p1
1.
Since p1
2 = x = 1
μ2 −
σ
2+|h
1
12|
2P
1
1
|h1
22|2 > 0 depends on p1
1,
the objective function (26) of user 1 is non-convex in p1
1 (the
KKT conditions can be written in the same way as done for
the previous cases and the problem is solved numerically).
Figure 5 depicts all of the 6 different cases depending on the
values of β1 and β2 (β2 <β 1).
As can be seen, in the ﬁrst case (β2 > 1, β1 > 1)t h e
leader has to perform one maximization over the interval
[0,1].I nt h esecond case (0 <β 2 < 1, β1 > 1), the leader
has to perform 2 maximizations ([0,β 2] and [β2,1]) and pick
the power allocation that maximizes his payoff. Similarly,
the leader has 3 maximizations to perform in the third case
([0,β 2], [β2,β 1] and [β1,1]) where 0 <β 1 < 1, 0 <β 2 < 1
and likewise for the remaining cases. In essence, in all these
cases, the leader (user 1) forces the follower to adopt a strategy
that maximizes the leader’s payoff. In this way, the Stackelberg
equilibrium is unique, solving thereby the problem of non-
uniqueness encountered in the non-cooperative approach of
Section IV. Additionally, one should note that there exist
Stackelberg solutions that are non-Nash equilibria of the non-
cooperative game.
VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate
the theoretical claims. Figure 4 depicts the average achievable
rate of both operators for the Stackelberg approach. In the
simulations, we let the individual power constraint ¯ P1 =
¯ P2 = ¯ P =1 , SNR =
¯ P
σ2 and channel fading realizations
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Rayleigh
distributed.
It is important to quantify the performance loss from the
optimal solution provided by the centralized strategy. To this
end, we compare the Stackelberg rates with the rates obtained
by sum-rate maximization (which are Pareto-optimal):
max
pn
1 ,pn
2
 K
i=1
 N
n=1 log2
 
1+
|h
n
ii|
2p
n
i
σ2
n+|hn
−ii|2pn
−i
 
 N
n=1 pn
1 ≤ ¯ P1,
 N
n=1 pn
2 ≤ ¯ P2,
pn
1 ≥ 0,p n
2 ≥ 0,n =1 ,..,N (27)
The objective function is non-convex in the power variables
pn
1 and pn
2. To solve (27) the maximization problem is trans-
formed into a convex optimization problem using Geometric
Programming [23].
Additionally, Figure 6 depicts the best and worst N.E where
the best N.E refers to the equilibrium maximizing the sum-
rate of both operators whereas the worst N.E case minimizes
it. It is also worth noting that the worst Nash equilibrium acts
like a lower-bound for the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the
Stackelberg approach is closer to the centralized approach as
compared to the selﬁsh case. This is due to the fact that in
the Stackelberg approach, operators take into account other
operators’ strategies whereas in the selﬁsh case, operators
behave carelessly by using water-ﬁlling.
Figure 7 shows the achievable rate region for both operators
in which the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are illustrated.
Since operator 1 is the leader, his rate is higher with the
Stackelberg approach. Also, interestingly, the rate of operator
2 is also better off with the Stackelberg approach. As a
result, both operators have strong incentives in adopting the
hierarchical (Stackelberg) approach
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of spectrum
sharing between operators operating in the same frequency
band. First, a one-shot game was studied where the players
play simultaneously, operating at the Nash equilibrium point.
It was found that the Nash equilibria regions exhibit different
behaviors according to the set of channel realizations. Some
regions have unique N.E whereas others have many. To solve
the non-unique characteristic of the game, a Stackelberg game
is proposed where one of the operators (leader) is ﬁrstly
deployed in the network while the other one (follower) is
deployed next.
In our future work, we will focus on the same spectrum
sharing problem using repeated games in an effort to approach
the Pareto-optimal solution.
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APPENDIX A
We derive the set of 9 inequalities for the Nash equilibria
when K =2users are transmitting over N =2carriers, for
the non-cooperative game ΓNC.
(α1,α 2)=( 0 ,0) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
 
c1 ≤ 1
1+g2
11+g2
21
c2 ≤ 1
1+g2
22+g2
12
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Fig. 6. Average achievable rate for both users versus the signal-to-noise ratio
for the centralized and Stackelberg approach. Moreover, the best and worst
Nash equilibria for the non-cooperative game are illustrated.
Fig. 7. Achievable rate region for the inter-operator spectrum sharing
game. Both operators achieve better payoffs when adopting the hierarchical
(Stackelbeg) approach.
(α1,α 2)=( 1 ,0) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
c1 ≥
1+g
1
11
1+g2
21
c2 ≤
1+g
1
12
1+g2
22
(α1,α 2)=( 0 ,1) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
c1 ≤
1+g
1
21
1+g2
11
c2 ≥
1+g
1
22
1+g2
12
(α1,α 2)=( 1 ,1) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
 
c1 ≥ 1+g1
11 + g1
21
c2 ≥ 1+g1
22 + g1
12
(α1,α 2)=( x,1) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
2g1
22g1
11 ≤ c2g1
11(1 + g2
12) − 2g1
11 − (c2g2
12 + g1
12)×
(c1 − 1+c1g2
11 − g1
21)
1+g
1
21
1+g2
11 ≤ c1 ≤ 1+g1
11 + g1
21
where x = 1
2 − 1
2g1
11 −
g
1
21
2g1
11 + 1
2g2
11
(α1,α 2)=( 1 ,x) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
2g1
11g1
22 ≤ c1g1
22(1 + g2
21) − 2g1
22 − (c1g2
21 + g1
21)×
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22 − g1
12)
1+g
1
12
1+g2
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22 + g1
12
where x = 1
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2g1
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g
1
12
2g1
22 + 1
2g2
22
(α1,α 2)=( 0 ,x) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
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⎨
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(α1,α 2)=( x,0) is a Nash Equilibrium ⇔
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(α1,α 2)=( x,y) is a N.E ⇔
 
0 <x<1
0 <y<1
x =
(2g
1
21(c1(1+g
2
12+g
2
21)−1)−(c1g
2
21+g
1
21)(c2(1+g
2
12)+g
1
22−1))
(4g1
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2
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2
12)
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12x)/2g1
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APPENDIX B
In this setup, the utility functions become:
⎧
⎨
⎩
R1(α1,α 2) = log2(1 +
|h
1
11|
2α1
σ2
1+|h1
21|2α2) + log2(1 +
|h
2
11|
2(1−α1)
σ2
2+|h2
21|2(1−α2))
R2(α1,α 2) = log2(1 +
|h
1
22|
2α2
σ2
1+|h1
12|2α1) + log2(1 +
|h
2
22|
2(1−α2)
σ2
2+|h2
12|2(1−α1))
We will give now sufﬁcient conditions that guarantee the
uniqueness of the N.E. By analyzing the ﬁrst order derivatives
of the payoff functions, we can ﬁnd explicit relations for the
best response functions (BR):
⎧
⎨
⎩
BR1(α2)=
−[|h
2
11|
2|h
1
21|
2+|h
1
11|
2|h
2
21|
2]α2−|h
2
11|
2+|h
1
11|
2(1+|h
2
21|
2+|h
2
11|
2)
2|h1
11|2|h2
11|2
BR2(α1)=
−[|h
2
22|
2|h
1
12|
2+|h
1
22|
2|h
2
12|
2]α1−|h
2
22|
2+|h
1
22|
2(1+|h
2
12|
2+|h
2
22|
2)
2|h1
22|2|h2
22|2
We observe that the functions BRi(α−i) are linear w.r.t.
α−i. Thus, the intersection of the BR functions is either a
unique point or an inﬁnity of points. Therefore, the sufﬁcient
conditions that ensure the uniqueness of the N.E are the
following:
⎧
⎨
⎩
|h
2
11|
2|h
1
21|
2+|h
1
11|
2|h
2
21|
2
2|h1
11|2|h2
11|2  =
2|h
1
22|
2|h
2
22|
2
|h2
22|2|h1
12|2+|h1
22|2|h2
12|2
−|h
2
11|
2+|h
1
11|
2(1+|h
2
21|
2+|h
2
11|
2)
2|h1
11|2|h2
11|2  =
−|h
2
22|
2+|h
1
22|
2(1+|h
2
12|
2+|h
2
22|
2)
|h2
22|2|h1
12|2+|h1
22|2|h2
12|2
If these conditions are met, the unique point at the intersection
of the BRs describes the Nash equilibrium. This is illustrated
in Figure 8.
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Fig. 8. Best response functions illustrating the unique Nash equilibrium point
where both operators transmit in both carriers.
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